Metonymy is based on a different type of relation between the dictionary and contextual meanings, a relation based not on identification, but on some kind of association connecting the two concepts which these meanings represent.
Thus, the word crown may stand for 'king or queen', cup or glass for 'the drink it contains', woolsack for 'the Chancellor of the Exchequer who sits on it, OJT the position and dignity of the Lord Chancellor*, e. g., "Here the noble lord inclined his knee to the Woolsack." (from Hansard).
Here also the interrelation between the dictionary and contextual meanings should stand out clearly and conspicuously. Only then can we state that a stylistic device is used. Otherwise we must turn our mind to lexicological problems, i.e. to the ways and means by which new words and meanings are coined. The examples of metonymy given above are traditional. In fact they are derivative logical meanings and therefore fixed in dictionaries. However, when such meanings are included in dictionaries, there is usually a label fig ('figurative use'). This shows that the new meaning has not replaced the primary one, but, as it were, co-exists with it.
Still the new meaning has become so common, that it is easily predictable and therefore does not bear any additional information, which is an indispensable condition for an SD.
Here are some more widely used metonymical meanings, some of which are already fixed in dictionaries without the label fig: the press for '(the personnel -connected with) a printing or publishing establishment', or for 'the newspaper and periodical literature which is printed by the printing press'. The bench is used as a generic term for 'magistrates and justices'. A hand is used for a worker, the cradle stands for infancy, earliest stages, place of origin, and the grave stands for death.
Metonymy used in language-in-action, i.e. contextual metonymy, is genuine metonymy and reveals a quite unexpected substitution of one word for another, or one concept for another, on the ground of some strong impression produced by a chance feature of the thing, for example:
"Miss Tox's hand trembled as she slipped it through Mr. Dombey's arm, and felt herself escorted up the steps, preceded by ajzocked hat and a Babylonian collar." (Dickens) 'A cocked hat and a Babylonian collar' stand for the wearer of the articles in question. One can hardly admit that there is a special characterizing function in such a substitution. The function of these examples of genuine metonymy is more likely to point out the insignificance of the wearer rather than his importance, for his personality is reduced to his externally conspicuous features, the hat and red collar.
Here is another example of genuine metony'my:
"Then they came in. Two of them, a man with long fair moustaches and a silent dark man... Definitely, the moustache and I had nothing in common." (Doris Lessing, "Retreat to Innocence")
Again we have a feature of a man which catches the eye, in this case his facial appearance: the moustache stands for the man himself. The function of the metonymy here is to indicate that the speaker knows nothing of the man in question, moreover, there.is a definite implication that this is the first time the speaker has seen him.
Here is another example of the same kind:
"There was something so very agreeable in being so intimate with such a waistcoat', in being on such off-hand terms so soon with such a pair of whiskers that Tom was uncommonly pleased with himself." (Dickens, "Hard Times")
In these two cases of genuine metonymy a broader context than that required by a metaphor is necessary in order to decipher the true meaning of the stylistic device. In both cases it is necessary to understand the words in their proper meanings first. Only then is it possible to grasp the metonymy.
In the following example the metonymy 'grape" also requires a broad context:
"And this is stronger than the strongest grape Could e'er express in its expanded, shape." (Byron)
Metonymy and metaphor differ also in the way they are deciphered. In the process of disclosing the meaning implied in a metaphor, one image excludes the other, that is, the metaphor 'lamp' in the 'The sky lamp of the night', when deciphered, means the moon, and though there is a definite interplay of meanings, we perceive only one object, the moon. This is not the case with metonymy. Metonymy, while presenting one object to our mind, does not exclude the other. In the example given above the moustache and the man himself are both perceived by the mind.
Many attempts have been made to pin-point the types of relation which metonymy is based on. Among them the following are most common:
1. A concrete thing used instead of an abstract notion. In this case the thing becomes a symbol of the notion, as in "The camp, the pulpit and the law For rich men's sons are free." (Shelley)
" 2. The container instead of the thing contained: • The hall applauded.
3. The relation of proximity, as in:
"The round game table was boisterous and happy." (Dickens)
4. The material instead of the thing made of it, as in: "The marble spoke." , -
5. The instrument which the doer uses in performing the action instead of the action or the doer himself, as in:
"Well, Mr. Weller, says the gentPmn, you're a very good whip, and can do what you like with your horses, we know." (Dickens)
"As the sword is the worst argument that can be used, so should it be the last." (Byron)
The list is4n no way complete. There are many other types of relations which may serve as a basis for metonymy.
It must also be noted that metonymy, being a means of building up imagery, generally 'concerns concrete objects, which are generalized. The process of generalization is easily carried out with the help of the I definite article. Therefore instances of metonymy are very often used with the definite article, or with no article at all, as in "There was perfect sympathy between Pulpit and Pew", where 'Pulpit' stands for the clergyman and 'Pew' for the congregation.
This is probably due to the fact 4hat any definition of a word may be taken for metonymy, inasmuch -as it shows a property or an essential quality of the concept, thus disclosing a kind of relation between the thing as a whole and a feature of it which may be regarded as part of it.